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Abstract
In this paper we develop a natural-deduction logic which is both constructive and relevant. We
use a proof-theoretic argument to justify the rules of the logic. The detailed framework we use to
develop our system is modeled on that used to develop Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory.
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1 Introduction and outline
In this paper we develop a natural-deduction logic which is both constructive
and relevant. We use a proof-theoretic argument, in the style of Dummett [6]
and Prawitz [15], to justify the rules of the logic.
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The informal motivation behind relevant logic is to have a notion of valid
argument which requires that the premisses really be used to infer the con-
clusion [10]. This imposes restrictions on the form of acceptable proofs in a
natural deduction system for a relevant logic. The informal motivation behind
constructive logic is that arguments should be eﬀective [5]. This condition also
imposes a restriction on the form of acceptable proofs. In both cases we are
concerned not merely with what we can prove, but also in how we prove it.
The framework we use to develop our system is modeled on that used
to develop Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory [11,12]. In using the Curry-Howard
analogy to analyse the implicational fragments of relevant logics we follow the
lead of Gabbay and de Queiroz [7], Helman [2], Meyer, Bunder and Powers [13],
and Restall [17]. Furthermore, the use of the Curry-Howard analogy makes
this work applicable to programming languages. The notion of relevance in a
proof is related to the notion of strictness of a function [2,3,4].
The paper develops as follows.
• In Section 2 we outline the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) [9] inter-
pretation of intuitionistic logic, and the related proof-theoretic justiﬁcation
of the logical laws. We pay particular attention to the Curry-Howard terms.
• In Section 3 we introduce CHR. For brevity, we only present the proposi-
tional fragment.
• In Section 4 we outline the proper proof reductions required to show that
CHR proofs are normalisable.
• In Section 5 we outline the proof that CHR is a relevant logic.
• In Section 6 we present some derivations in CHR.
• Our conclusions are presented in Section 7.
2 Proof-theoretical justifications of the logical laws
We shall only outline the main points of the process that one goes through
to give a proof-theoretical justiﬁcations of the logical laws. This process is
dealt with with in more detail and with more care by, in particular, Michael
Dummett and Dag Prawitz (see, for example, [5,6,15]). The process we use
diﬀers slightly from that described by Dummett.
• The argument usually take some rules as being “self-evident”, typically
single-ended introduction rules meeting the complexity condition [8,6].
• These rules alone do not deﬁne the meanings of the logical constants. We
make two observations. First, consider tonk [16]. The constants tonk and
∨ share the same introduction rules, but not the same meaning. Second,
N. Leslie, E.D. Mares / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 91 (2004) 158–170 159
the meanings of the constants of NK and NJ must be diﬀerent. But, as
Gentzen [8] points out,NK isNJ+ DN. DN is certainly not an introduction
rule.
• We claim that the solution for constructivists is to seek harmony in com-
putation [5,12,15]. Formally, in Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory we use the com-
putation rules to further specify the meanings of the connectives.
• The form of the elimination rule for each connective is then deﬁned by the
combination of introduction and computation rules.
• Consequently we will present slightly diﬀerent computation rules from those
used for intuitionistic logic, and hence produce a natural constructive rele-
vant logic.
So, the pattern for each connective we deal with will be:
• introduction rule or rules, taken as self-evident;
• computation rule or rules, taken to embody relevance;
• elimination rule, drawn from the introduction and computation rules.
This pattern is just that used when presenting Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory
[11,14]. Our syntax is presented using aritied expressions, as used by Martin-
Lo¨f. The detailed development of a theory of aritied expressions is given in [14],
and we will not repeat this here. Similarly our inference rules are presented in
a natural deduction format modeled on that of [11]. Our computation rules
also follow the format of those in [11].
The following table gives the BHK interpretation of intuitionistic proposi-
tional logic. The direct proof tells us what the introduction rule or rules will
look like, and the Curry-Howard terms provide us with formal proof objects
for valid propositions. Another way to see the Curry-Howard terms is that
they are labels which just name the proof. This table is really the starting
point for the proof-theoretical justiﬁcation of the laws of intuitionistic logic,
and forms the basis for extending this technique to other logics.
Proposition Direct proof Curry-Howard term
⊥ - -
A ∨B A proof of A or B, and an indica-
tion of which.
inl(a) or inr(b)
A & B A proof of A and a proof of B. pair(a, b)
A ⊃ B A method to construct a proof of
B given a proof of A.
λ(b)
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We employ the following deﬁnition:
¬A =def A ⊃⊥
3 Curry-Howard Relevant logic: CHR
Now we start to develop CHR. The obvious starting point is that proofs of
relevant implications are strict functions. By this we mean that we can only
abstract over variables which actually occur inside the term. Note that this is
not exactly the notion of strictness used in functional programming where we
treat strictness of a function f as the property that f(⊥) is equal to ⊥, where
⊥ here is a non-terminating term.
3.1 Relevant implication
For clarity, we use
rel
−→ for relevant implication and λ
s
for strict function
abstraction. Figure 1 is then the introduction rule for relevant implication.
Notice the side-condition.
[x : A]
·
·
·
b(x) : B
λ
s
(b) : A
rel
−→ B
Side condition: b(x) is strict in x.
Fig. 1. Relevant implication introduction
We can see that there is no normal proof 4 of A
rel
−→ B
rel
−→ A. Figure 2 is
a normal-form proof of A ⊃ B ⊃ A in intuitionistic logic, where we see that
the formal proof object involves vacuous abstraction.
[x : A]1
⊃ I
λ((y)x) : B ⊃ A
⊃ I1
λ((x)λ((y)x)) : A ⊃ (B ⊃ A)
Fig. 2. A non-relevant proof
The rule for funsplit computation is given by Figure 3 5 .
4 Of course this does not preclude their being a proof with a detour, as we have not yet
proved that all proofs are normalisable.
5 We have an η rule at the level of syntax, so b is syntactically equal to (x)b(x) (x not
free in b) [14]. In practice, one only ever abstracts over one of the arguments to a non-
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f −→ λ
s
(b) d(b) −→ d′
funsplit Comp.
funsplit(d, f) −→ d′
Fig. 3. funsplit computation
The rule for
rel
−→ elimination, following the pattern of Π-elimination from
[11], is given by Figure 5.
f : A
rel
−→ B
[y(x) : B[x : A]]
·
·
·
a(y) : C
rel
−→ Elim.
funsplit(a, f) : C
Fig. 4.
rel
−→ elimination
We can make the following deﬁnition:
apply(f, x) =def funsplit((y)(y(x)), f)
Figure 5 shows how we evaluate apply(f, a). Evaluation of b(a) will involve
evaluation of a.
f −→ λ
s
(b)
b(a) −→ c
≡, β
(y)(y(a))b −→ c
funsplit Comp.
funsplit((y)(y(a)), f) −→ c
=def
apply(f, a) −→ c
Fig. 5. Evaluating apply(f, a)
We can use apply to give ourselves a derived elimination rule for
rel
−→, after
the fashion of Modus Ponens. We use this rule in Figures 27, 28, 29, 31, and
32, where we label it
rel
−→ E’.
3.2 Conjunctions
We have both an intensional and an extensional conjunction. Figure 6 is the
rule for intensional conjunction introduction. There is no side-condition on
this rule.
Figure 7 is rule for extensional conjunction introduction. This rule has the
side condition that the proofs of both conjuncts share the same free variables.
canonical constant, the one which has the type being eliminated. If this is the right-most
argument we can make expressions less cluttered. Hence, for all the non-canonical constants
we adopt the convention that the argument which has the type being eliminated appears
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a : A b : B
〈a, b〉 : A •B
Fig. 6. Intensional conjunction introduction
a : A b : B
pair(a, b) : A ∧B
Side condition: FV(a) = FV(b).
Fig. 7. Extensional conjunction introduction
The diﬀerence between • and ∧ is further shown in the elimination rules,
and this reﬂects the diﬀerence in the computation rules for the two kinds of
splitting we have. The rule for spliti computation is given in Figure 8, and the
rule for splite computation is given in Figure 9. The diﬀerence comes about
from whether c is strict or not.
p −→ 〈a, b〉 a −→ a′ b −→ b′ c(a′, b′) −→ c′
spliti Comp.
spliti(c, p) −→ c
′
Fig. 8. spliti computation
p −→ pair(a, b) c(a, b) −→ c′
splite Comp.
splite(c, p) −→ c
′
Fig. 9. splite computation
Figures 10 and 11 are the elimination rules for • and ∧, respectively. In
• elimination the side-condition is that c is strict in both its arguments, in ∧
elimination c may be non-strict in both arguments.
p : A •B
[x : A, y : B]
·
·
·
c(x, y) : C
• Elim.
spliti(c, p) : C
Side condition: c is strict in both arguments.
Fig. 10. • elimination
Figure 12 is a derivation of A ∧ B 	 A •B.
as the right-most argument.
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p : A ∧B
[x : A, y : B]
·
·
·
c(x, y) : C
∧ Elim.
splite(c, p) : C
Fig. 11. ∧ elimination
p : A ∧ B [x : A]1
∧ E.1
splite((x, y)x, p) : A
p : A ∧ B [y : B]2
∧ E.2
splite((x, y)y, p) : B
• I.
〈splite((x, y)x, p), splite((x, y)y, p)〉 : A •B
Fig. 12. A ∧ B  A •B
We can show now that there is no normal proof of A •B 	 A∧B. Such a
proof would either be like Figure 13 or Figure 14. Figure 13 fails because the
free variables diﬀer, Figure 14 fails because of the strictness condition.
p : A •B
[x : A]1 [y : B]1
∧ I.
pair(x, y) : A ∧B
• E.1
spliti((x, y)pair(x, y), p) : A ∧B
Fig. 13. A non-proof of A •B  A ∧ B
p : A •B [x : A]1
• E.1
spliti((x, y)x, p) : A
p : A •B [y : B]2
• E.2
spliti((x, y)y, p) : B
∧ I.
pair(spliti((x, y)x, p), spliti((x, y)y, p)) : A ∧B
Fig. 14. Another non-proof of A •B  A ∧B
3.3 Disjunction
The rules for ∨ introduction are given in Figures 15 and 16, and the compu-
tation rules for when are given by Figures 17 and 18.
a : A
∨ I l
inl(a) : A ∨ B
Fig. 15. ∨ Intro L
Figure 19 is the elimination rule for ∨. This rule has the the side condition
that d and e are strict. We may also add the side condition that FV(d) = FV(e)
to enable us to prove thatCHR is a relevant logic in the sense of Anderson and
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b : B
∨ I r
inr(b) : A ∨B
Fig. 16. ∨ Intro R
f −→ inl(l) d(l) −→ d′
when Comp
when(d, e, f) −→ d′
Fig. 17. when computation 1
f −→ inr(r) e(r) −→ e′
when Comp
when(d, e, f) −→ e′
Fig. 18. when computation 2
Belnap [1]. We do not, however, know that any irrelevances are derivable if
this side condition is omitted. Thus we assume the side-condition henceforth.
f : A ∨B
[x : A]
·
·
·
d(x) : C
[y : B]
·
·
·
e(y) : C
∨ E
when(d, e, f) : C
Side condition: d and e are strict
Fig. 19. ∨ elimination
3.4 The absurd
There is no introduction rule for ⊥. The computation rule for case{} is given
by Figure 20, and the elimination rule for ⊥ by Figure 21.
e −→ e′
case{} Comp
case{}(f) −→ e
′
Fig. 20. case{} computation
f :⊥
⊥ E
case{}(f) : C
Fig. 21. ⊥ elimination
Relevant negation can then be deﬁned in the expected way.
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4 Proof reductions
The normalisation theorem states that a proof with a maximum formula can
be converted into a proof of the same thing without a maximum formula. We
present the proper proof reductions which give us the core of the normalisation
procedure. For brevity we do not present the commuting conversions. As usual
we deﬁne a single-step of reduction, 1, whose reﬂexive, transitive closure, ∗,
is conﬂuent. The relation 1 is derived from the computation rules, of course.
The single-step reductions on proof fragments are given in Figures 22 to 26.
Again, for brevity, we do not show the conﬂuence of ∗ here.
[x : A]
·
·
·
λ
s
(b) : A
rel
−→ B
[y(z) : B[z : A]]
·
·
·
d(y) : C
funsplit(d, λ
s
(b)) : C
1
[b(x) : B[x : A]]
·
·
·
d(b) : C
Fig. 22. Removing a
rel
−→ maximum
·
·
·
a : A
·
·
·
b : B
〈a, b〉 : A •B
[x : A, y : B]
·
·
·
d(x, y) : C
spliti(d, 〈a, b〉) : C
1
·
·
·
a : A
·
·
·
b : B
·
·
·
d(a, b) : C
Fig. 23. Removing a • maximum
·
·
·
a : A
·
·
·
b : B
pair(a, b) : A ∧B
[x : A, y : B]
·
·
·
d(x, y) : C
splite(d, pair(a, b)) : C
1
·
·
·
a : A
·
·
·
b : B
·
·
·
d(a, b) : C
Fig. 24. Removing a ∧ maximum
5 CHR is a relevant logic
In this section we outline a proof that CHR is a relevant logic in the sense of
Anderson and Belnap [1]. To prove this we simply assign a distinct number
to each variable which occurs in any proof object in a CHR proof. We then
replace each proof object with the set of numbers that occur in it. By a simple
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·
·
·
a : A
inl(a) : A ∨ B
[x : A]
·
·
·
d(x) : C
[y : B]
·
·
·
e(y) : C
when(d, e, inl(a)) : C
1
a : A
·
·
·
d(a) : C
Fig. 25. Removing a ∨ left maximum
·
·
·
b : B
inr(b) : A ∨ B
[x : A]
·
·
·
d(x) : C
[y : B]
·
·
·
e(y) : C
when(d, e, inr(b)) : C
1
b : B
·
·
·
e(b) : C
Fig. 26. Removing a ∨ right maximum
induction over the complexity of proofs, we can show that the re-annotated
proofs are notational variants of proofs in Anderson and Belnap’s natural
deduction system for their logic R of relevant implication [1].
By a slightly more involved process we can show that the set of theorems
of CHR is just the set of theorems of the logic LR of Thistlewaite, Meyer
and McRobbie [18].
6 Examples
In Figures 27 to 32 we give examples of some CHR proofs. The theorems
proved are:
• Fig. 27 (A •B)
rel
−→ C 	 A
rel
−→ (B
rel
−→ C)
• Fig. 28 A
rel
−→ (B
rel
−→ C) 	 (A •B)
rel
−→ C
• Fig. 29 A
rel
−→ (B
rel
−→ C) 	 B
rel
−→ (A
rel
−→ C)
• Fig. 30 A •B 	 B • A
• Fig. 31 (B • A)
rel
−→ C 	 (A •B)
rel
−→ C
• Fig. 32 A
rel
−→ (A
rel
−→ B) 	 A
rel
−→ B
7 Conclusions
We have presented CHR a constructive, relevant natural-deduction logic. We
have justiﬁed the rules of the logic an a proof-theoretic fashion, based on the
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[x : A]1 [y : B]2
• I
〈x, y〉 : A •B f : (A •B)
rel
−→ C
rel
−→ E’
apply(f, 〈x, y〉) : C
rel
−→ I 2
λ
s
((y)(apply(f, 〈x, y〉))) : B
rel
−→ C
rel
−→ I 1
λ
s
((x)λ
s
((y)(apply(f, 〈x, y〉)))) : A
rel
−→ (B
rel
−→ C)
Fig. 27. (A •B)
rel
−→ C  A
rel
−→ (B
rel
−→ C)
[p : A •B]1
[y : B]2
[x : A]2 f : A
rel
−→ (B
rel
−→ C)
rel
−→ E’
apply(f, x) : B
rel
−→ C
rel
−→ E’
apply(apply(f, x), y) : C
• E2
spliti((x, y)(apply(apply(f, x), y))), p) : C rel
−→ I 1
λ
s
(spliti((x, y)(apply(apply(f, x), y)))) : (A •B)
rel
−→ C
Fig. 28. A
rel
−→ (B
rel
−→ C)  (A • B)
rel
−→ C
[y : B]1
[x : A]2 f : A
rel
−→ (B
rel
−→ C)
rel
−→ E’
apply(f, x) : B
rel
−→ C
rel
−→ E’
apply(apply(f, x), y) : C
rel
−→ I 2
λ
s
((x)(apply(apply(f, x), y))) : A
rel
−→ C
rel
−→ I 1
λ
s
((y)(λ
s
((x)(apply(apply(f, x), y))))) : B
rel
−→ (A
rel
−→ C)
Fig. 29. A
rel
−→ (B
rel
−→ C)  B
rel
−→ (A
rel
−→ C)
p : A •B
[y : B]1 [x : A]1
• I
〈y, x〉 : B • A
• E1
spliti((x, y)〈y, x〉, p) : B • A
Fig. 30. A •B  B •A
notion that relevant proof is captured by strict computation. The system we
have produced is clear and simple. The proof rules are natural to use, as we
have shown in examples. We have outlined how this logic relates to other
relevant logics. Because we have developed this logic as a type theory, there
is a natural computer science interpretation of propositions in this logic as
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[p : A •B]1
[y : B]2 [x : A]2
• I
〈y, x〉 : B • A
• E2
spliti((x, y)〈y, x〉, p) : B • A f : (B • A)
rel
−→ C
rel
−→ E’
apply(f, spliti((x, y)〈y, x〉, p)) : C rel
−→ I 1
λ
s
((p)apply(f, spliti((x, y)〈y, x〉, p))) : (A •B)
rel
−→ C
Fig. 31. (B •A)
rel
−→ C  (A • B)
rel
−→ C
[x : A]1
[x : A]1 f : A
rel
−→ (A
rel
−→ B)
rel
−→ E’
apply(f, x) : A
rel
−→ B
rel
−→ E’
apply(apply(f, x), x) : B
rel
−→ I 1
λ
s
((x)(apply(apply(f, x), x))) : A
rel
−→ B
Fig. 32. A
rel
−→ (A
rel
−→ B)  A
rel
−→ B
specifying strict functions.
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